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CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORT-FEASORS IN
WASHINGTON: THE 1981 TORT REFORM ACT
Contribution is the right of a tort-feasor who has paid an injured plain-
tiff to obtain partial reimbursement from others responsible for the injury.
Until 1981 this right was not available to tort-feasors in Washington.
With the 1981 Tort Reform Act,' Washington joined forty-one other
states in allowing contribution. 2
This Comment analyzes the legislation creating and regulating contri-
bution in Washington. It examines the nature and scope of the right to
contribution and discusses the procedural aspects of the Act. The Com-
ment closes with an analysis of the interaction of contribution rights and
settlements, and concludes that the settlement provisions of the Act
should be construed to maximize the recoveries by injured plaintiffs and
to encourage settlements in tort suits.
I. THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF CONTRIBUTION
A. Common Law
Before the 1981 Tort Reform Act, Washington embraced the common-
law rule that no right to contribution exists among joint tort-feasors. 3 This
rule originated in the 1799 English case of Merryweather v. Nixan4 and
was adopted by the Washington Supreme Court in City of Seattle v. Puget
Sound Improvement Co.5 The rationale for denying contribution was that
public policy should not permit a defendant to base a cause of action on
1. Ch. 27, 1981 Wash. Laws 112 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE chs. 4.22, 7.72 (1981)).
2. The eight jurisdictions not allowing some form of contribution by 1981 are Arizona, Connecti-
cut, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Virginia. See H. WOODS, COMPARA-
TlVE FAULT 421 app. (1978) & 127 app. (Supp. 1981); see also V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLI-
GENCE § 16.7 (1974 & Supp. 1981) (discussing statutory and common-law contribution systems in
other jurisdictions).
3. Some confusion surrounds the term "joint tort-feasor." It generally refers to tort-feasors who
are jointly and severally liable for a plaintiffs injuries. The plaintiff can sue all of them or can re-
cover all damages from any one. See generally notes 44-54 and accompanying text infra (discussing
joint and several liability). Washington courts have defined "joint tort-feasors" more narrowly as
those acting in concert in cases determining when a release of one defendant releases the others. See
notes 21-24 and accompanying text infra. "Joint tort-feasors" as used in this Comment, unless
otherwise specified, refers to persons jointly and severally liable for a plaintiff's injuries.
4. 8 Term. Rep. 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799).
5. 47 Wash. 22, 25, 91 P. 255, 257 (1907). Washington allowed contribution when liability was
not based on tort. See, e.g., Hanson v. Hanson, 55 Wn. 2d 884, 887-88, 350 P.2d 859, 861 (1960)
(divorced spouse must contribute one-half of tax liability, incurred during marriage, for which both
are liable); Karnatz v. Murphy Pac. Corp., 8 Wn. App. 76, 81,503 P.2d 1145, 1149 (1972) (contri-
bution right exists between co-obligors on contract).
479
Washington Law Review
the defendant's own wrong. 6 As comparative fault replaced contributory
negligence and permitted plaintiffs to recover despite their own negli-
gence, this rationale became less cogent. 7
Even before 1981, a form of contribution was allowed to tort-feasors in
Washington under the "active/passive indemnity rule." Under this rule, a
"passively negligent" defendant could obtain reimbursement from an
"actively negligent" joint tort-feasor. 8 The rule shifted the entire burden
of liability to the active tort-feasor.
Washington courts applied the active/passive indemnity rule inconsis-
tently. In one case, for example, a plaintiff shipowner failed to inspect a
dockowner's faulty crane. The crane collapsed, injuring an employee of
the plaintiff. After compensating the employee, the shipowner brought an
indemnity action against the dockowner. The Washington Supreme Court
held that the plaintiff's failure to inspect was not necessarily active negli-
gence but instead could be found to be passive. 9 But in another case,
when the same plaintiff failed to inspect a dockowner's faulty gangplank
that collapsed and injured a worker, the court held that the shipowner's
negligence was active as a matter of law. 10 These and other inconsistent
results, I" coupled with the harshness of not allowing contribution, fueled
judicial and legislative dissatisfaction with the no-contribution rule.
The Washington Supreme Court expressed some of this judicial dissa-
tisfaction in Wenatchee Wenoka Growers Association v. Krack Corp. 12
The court there conceded that allowing contribution among tort-feasors
6. Alaska Steamship Co. v. Pacific Coast Gypsum Co., 71 Wash. 359, 362-363, 128 P. 654,
656(1912).
7. WASHINGTON STATE SENATE SELECT COMM. ON TORT & PRODUCT LIABILITY REFORM, FINAL
REPORT, 47TH LEG. REG. SESS. 20-23 (1981) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT], reprinted in
1981 WASH. S. JOUR. 626-27. There are slight changes in wording between the Final Report and the
reprinted version in the Senate Journal, but there are no changes in substance.
8. E.g., Rufener v. Scott, 46 Wn. 2d 240, 242, 280 P.2d 253, 255 (1955). For example, a
municipality that negligently allowed an obstruction to remain in a street recovered from a contractor
who negligently put the obstruction there, in City of Cle Elum v. Yeaman, 145 Wash. 157, 160, 259
P. 35, 36 (1927).
9. Alaska S.S. Co. v. Pacific Coast Gypsum Co., 71 Wash. 359, 367, 128 P. 654, 660 (1912).
The court remanded for a determination of whether the negligence was passive.
10. Alaska S.S. Co. v. Sperry Flour Co., 122 Wash. 642,646-47, 211 P. 761, 762-63 (1922).
11. In Aberdeen Constr. Co. v. City of Aberdeen, 84 Wash. 429, 434-35, 147 P. 2, 4 (1915),
the court held that a collapsing excavation made in accordance with an independent engineer's plans
could be the result of passive negligence on the contractor's part. But in Weston v. New Bethel
Missionary Baptist Church, 23 Wn. App. 747, 755, 598 P.2d 411,415-16 (1978), the court found
that church members who built a collapsing rockery in accordance with an independent consultant's
plans were actively negligent.
In other cases, the court held one municipality to be actively negligent for allowing a private fire
escape to obstruct a sidewalk, Turner v. City of Tacoma, 72 Wn. 2d 1029, 1037-38, 435 P.2d 927,
932 (1967); but it found another city to be passively negligent for allowing a contractor to leave an
obstruction in the street, City of Cle Elum v. Yeaman, 145 Wash. 157, 160, 259 P. 35, 36 (1927).




might be more fair than the common-law rule, but unanimously refused to
adopt contribution because of the many-AifficultiesLin implementation.
The court identified these difficulties to be the problems of enforcement,
proportionment, settlement, and abandonment of joint and several liabil-
ity altogether. 13 The Tort Reform Act addresses these problems in detail.
B. Contribution Under the Tort Reform Act
In 1981, the Washington Legislature passed the Tort Reform Act, 14
modeling the contribution sections after the Uniform Comparative Fault
Act. 15 The Washington Act states:
A right of contribution exists between or among two or more persons who
are jointly and severally liable upon the same indivisible claim for the same
injury, death or harm, whether or not judgment has been recovered against
all or any of them .... The basis for contribution among liable persons is
the comparative fault of each such person. However, the court may deter-
mine that two or more persons ate to be treated as a single person for pur-
poses of contribution. 16
The sections that follow discuss the application of this statute.
1. Scope of Contribution
The right of contribution exists between any defendants "jointly and
severally liable upon the same indivisible claim for the same injury, death
or harm.1 7 A claim is indivisible when the victim's injuries cannot be
segregated and causally linked to the separate actions of each tort-fea-
sor.18 When the acts of multiple tort-feasors cause damages that can be
13. Id. at 854,576 P.2d at 391-92.
14. Ch. 27, 1981 Wash. Laws 112 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE chs. 4.22,7.72 (1981)).
15. Compare WASH. REv. CODE ch. 4.22 (1981) with UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACr §§ 4-6,
12 U.L.A. 40 (Supp. 1982). The only substantial departures from the Uniform Act are vicarious
liability and settlements. Both are discussed below. See notes 41-43 & 105-09 and accompanying
text infra.
16. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.040(1) (1981).
17. Id.
18. This indivisibility gives rise to the required joint and several liability. Id. § 4.22.030. The
court in Fugere v. Pierce, 5 Wn. App. 592, 490 P.2d 132 (1971), which involved a multiple-impact
accident, said:
The majority view in our country in cases similar to the instant one, where there are collisions
in rapid succession producing a single end result, and no substantial proof as to what damage
was caused by each collision, is to hold each tort-feasor jointly and severally liable.... This has
come to be known as the "single indivisible injury rule."
Id. at 597-98, 490 P.2d at 135. The person seeking to avoid imposition of joint and several-liability
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linked to the separate acts of each tort-feasor, the claim is divisible and
excluded from the scope of the Act. 19 This is consistent with the scope of
contribution rights in other jurisdictions. 20
The Washington courts' traditional classification of multiple tort-fea-
sors as "joint," "concurrent," or "successive" does not determine the
availability of contribution. Indivisibility of harm is the sole criterion un-
der the Act. Therefore, "joint" tort-feasors--those who act in concert to
produce the plaintiff's injuries 21-have contribution rights only if the
harms they cause are indivisible. 22 "Concurrent" tort-feasors-those
whose independent acts of negligence combine to cause a nonsegregable
injury-have contribution rights because the harm they cause is, by defi-
nition, indivisible. 23 A "successive" tort-feasor-whose acts aggravate
injuries caused by an earlier tort-feasor-has no contribution rights be-
cause the harm caused is divisible. 24
The Act also abolishes the active/passive indemnity rule. 25 The com-
parative fault sections of the Act replace the old rule adequately. If one
tort-feasor's negligence is so insubstantial that it formerly would have
been considered passive, the finder of fact can simply allocate little or no
comparative fault to that tort-feasor under the contribution system. 26
has the burden to prove that the damages can be segregated and assigned according to causation, Id.
at 599, 490 P.2d at 136.
19. The claim is also excluded because liability is not joint and several. See Young v. Dille. 127
Wash. 398, 404, 220 P. 782, 784 (1923) (multiple-impact automobile accident in which injuries
could be segregated and identified with separate impacts).
20. Other jurisdictions generally hold that contribution applies whenever the harm is indivisible,
no matter how tort-feasors are characterized. E.g., New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Holmes, 435
F.2d 1232, 1234-35 (1st Cir. 1970) (construing Rhode Island law); Getzelman v. Lacovara, 82
A.D.2d 823, 439 N.Y.S.2d 433, 434 (1981). Other jurisdictions also hold that when damages in-
flicted by multiple tort-feasors are separable, liability is not joint and several, and contribution is not
appropriate. E.g., Carrols Equities Corp. v. Villnave, 76 Misc. 2d 205, 350 N.Y.S.2d 90, 92 (Sup.
Ct. 1973), aff'd, 49 A.D.2d 672, 373 N.Y.S.2d 1012 (App. Div. 1975).
21. Modem Washington decisions restricted use of the term "joint tort-feasors" to describing
persons who acted in concert in causing a harm. See, e.g., DeNike v. Mowery, 69 Wn. 2d 357, 368,
418 P.2d 1010, 1017 (1966); Litts v. Pierce County, 5 Wn. App. 531, 536, 488 P.2d 785, 788-89
(1971). An example is two drivers who race and injure a third person. W. PROSSER, LAW OF ToRTS §
46 (4th ed. 1971). If the harm they cause cannot be segregated and identified with the actions of each
tort-feasor, contribution is appropriate.
22. Contribution would not apply if the tort-feasors' common purpose was to harm the plaintiff.
Tort-feasors who act intentionally cannot obtain contribution from others at fault. See note 30 and
accompanying text infra.
23. E.g., Litts v. Pierce County, 5 Wn. App. 531, 536-37, 488 P.2d 785, 789 (1971). An
example is two drivers acting independently who negligently cause a multiple-automobile accident
that injures the plaintiff.
24. See, e.g., DeNike v. Mowery, 69 Wn. 2d 357, 368, 418 P.2d 1010, 1017 (1966) (plastic
surgeon aggravated injuries to a plaintiff's face caused by a previous tort-feasor).
25. WASH. REv. CODE § 4.22.040(3) (1981).
26. See notes 37-40 and accompanying text infra (discussing comparative fault allocation).
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Other jurisdictions allow contribution even though the plaintiff pursues
different theories, such as negligence and strict liability, against each tort-
feasor. 27 Washington's Act also authorizes contribution despite differing
bases for liability. Contribution is based on the "comparative fault" of
each liable person.28 Fault is broadly defined to include negligence, strict
liability, recklessness, assumption of risk, breach of warranty, and failure
to avoid injury. 29 Intentional harm is excluded from the scope of the Act,
however. The Act's drafters intended that one who intentionally harms
another should not be able to allocate fault to others. 30
A question exists whether persons whom the plaintiff could not sue
directly can be held liable indirectly through contribution. This problem
often arises when an injured employee collects worker's compensation
from the state and then sues the manufacturer of the product that injured
him. The manufacturer attempts to obtain contribution from the plaintiff's
employer, who is protected from direct suit by the plaintiff under the
state's worker's compensation act. Most jurisdictions consider contribu-
tion inappropriate in these circumstances because the employer's liability
is absolutely limited by the worker's compensation act. 31
The Washington Supreme Court indicated in Seattle First National
Bank v. Shoreline Concrete Co. 32 that third-party actions against a plain-
tiff's employer are impermissible because the worker's compensation law
immunizes employers from tort liability. 33 The Seattle First rationale
27. E.g., W.D. Rubright Co. v. International Harvester Co., 358 F. Supp. 1388, 1400 (W.D.
Pa. 1973) (combining strict liability and negligence to allow contribution); Safeway Stores, Inc. v.
Nest-Kart, 21 Cal. App. 3d 322, 332, 146 Cal. Rptr. 550, 555 (1978) (same); Sanchez v. City of
Espanola, 94 N.M. 676, 615 P.2d 993, 995 (1980) (same). One court also allowed contribution to a
defendant liable for negligence who sued a third party based on breach of contract. ICI America, Inc.
v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 368 F. Supp. 1148, 1151 (D. Del. 1974).
28. WASH. REv. CODE § 4.22.040(1) (1981).
29. Id. § 4.22.015. This section provides:
"Fault" includes acts or omissions, including misuse of a product, that are in any measure
negligent or reckless toward the person or property of the actor or others, or that subject a person
to strict tort liability or liability on a product liability claim. The term also includes breach of
warranty, unreasonable assumption of risk, and unreasonable failure to avoid an injury or to
mitigate damages. Legal requirements of causal relation apply both to fault as the basis for
liability and to contributory fault.
30. SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 47, reprinted in 1981 WASH. S. JOUR. 635; see also UNIF.
COMPARATiVE FAULT AcT § 1, commissioners' comment, 12 U.L.A. 35 (Supp. 1982) (parallel provi-
sion in Uniform Act excludes intentional conduct).
31. See, e.g., Rowe v. John C. Motter Printing Press Co., 273 F. Supp. 363, 365 (D.R.I. 1967);
E.B. Wills Co. v. Superior Court of Merced County, 56 Cal. App. 3d 650, 654-55, 128 Cal. Rptr.
541, 544 (1976); Baltimore Transit Co. v. State, 183 Md. 674, 39 A.2d 858, 860-61 (1944); Cac-
chillo v. H. Leach Mach. Co., I I I R.I. 593, 305 A.2d 541, 544 (1973). Contra Dole v. Dow Chem.
Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143,282 N.E.2d 288,294 (1972).
32. 91 Wn. 2d 230,588 P.2d 1308 (1978).
33. The court stated that the worker's compensation act, WASH. REv. CODE tit. 51 (1981), abol-
ishes judicial jurisdiction over all personal injury actions arising between employees and employers.
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should bar contribution actions as well. This result comports with the
worker's compensation policy of strict but limited liability for workplace
injuries. 34
The immunity problem also arises with automobile host-guest statutes
and with suits between spouses. Most courts hold that if the plaintiff
could not sue the potential contributor directly, contribution is unavail-
able. 35 These courts have concluded that contribution in these cases
would allow an indirect action against the immune defendant, which
would circumvent the policies behind the various tort immunities. 36 This
approach would be appropriate under Washington's Act because the right
to contribution is based on the defendants' joint and several liability. Be-
cause joint liability with an immune tort-feasor is impossible, contribu-
tion is improper.
2. Apportionment of Liabilit,
The Act provides that "[t]he basis for contribution among liable per-
sons is the comparative fault of each such person." 37 The liability of each
tort-feasor is determined in the same way that negligent plaintiffs' reco-
91 Wn. 2d at 241-42, 588 P.2d at 1316: accord Olch v. Pacific Press & Shear Co.. 19 Wn. App. 89.
92, 573 P.2d 1355. 1357 (1978).
34. See Thompson v. Lewis County. 92 Wn. 2d 204, 208, 595 P.2d 541, 543 (1979) (stating that
worker's compensation abolishes common-law actions against employer): Montoya v. Greenway
Aluminum Co., 10 Wn. App. 630, 634. 519 P.2d 22, 25 (1974) (worker's compensation imposes
strict liability on employer for workplace injuries); see also WASH. REV. CODE § 51.04.010 (1981)
(strict liability for workplace injuries replaces common-law system of tort recovery).
The Tort Reform Act intentionally failed to deal with this issue. The drafters of the Act thought
that any changes in worker's compensation law would be better made after an analysis by the Joint
Committee on Worker's Compensation. SENATE REPORT. supra note 7, at 26, reprinted in 1981
WAstH. S. JOUR. 629.
35. E.g., Cox v. Maddux. 255 F. Supp. 517, 527 (E.D. Ark. 1966) (claim barred by Federal
Tort Claims Act), rev'don other grounds, 382 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1967): Oahu Ry. & Land Co. v.
United States, 73 F. Supp. 707, 709 (D. Hawaii 1947) (same): Ferguson v. Davis. 48 Del. 229. 102
A.2d 707, 708 (1954) (claim barred by interspousal immunity): Rigsby v. Tyre. 380 A.2d 1371.
1373 (Del. Super. Ct. 1977) (claim barred by host-guest immunity): Ennis v. Donavan. 222 Md.
536. 167 A.2d 698, 700-01 (1960) (claim barred by interspousal immunity): O'Mara v. H.P. Hood
& Sons, Inc., 359 Mass. 235, 268 N.E.2d 685, 688 (1971) (claim barred by host-guest immunity).
36. E.g., Oahu Ry. & Land Co. v. United States, 73 F. Supp. 707, 709 (D. Hawaii 1947):
Rigsby v. Tyre, 380 A.2d 1371, 1373 (Del. Super. Ct. 1977). Contra Zarrella v. Miller, 100 R.I.
545, 217 A.2d 673, 675 (1966) (holding contribution to be appropriate from plaintiff's husband de-
spite interspousal immunity). Oddly, the Rhode Island court does not allow contribution suits against
plaintiffs' employers. Cacchillo v. H. Leach Mach. Co., Ill R.I. 593, 305 A.2d 541, 543-44
(1973). The court in Cacchillo explained this inconsistency with Zarrella on the basis of the different
policies underlying the two immunities. Id.. 305 A.2d at 543-44: cf. Fleischer v. Uccelini, 81 Misc.
2d 22. 365 N.Y.S.2d 722 (1975) (holding contribution to be appropriate even though contributor had
obtained failure-to-prosecute dismissal against the injured plaintiff).
37. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.040(1) (1981).
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veries are reduced in comparative negligence cases. 38 In comparing the
tort-feasors' fault, the finder of fact is to consider "both the nature of the
conduct of the parties to the action and the extent of the causal relation
between such conduct and the damages. ,,39 For example, the actions of
two tort-feasors may be equal causes of the plaintiff's harm, but one may
have acted recklessly and the other negligently. The provision allows the
finder of fact to affix a higher percentage of comparative fault to the tort-
feasor who acted recklessly.40
3. Vicarious Liability
The Tort Reform Act provides that, in allocating comparative fault,
"the court may determine that two or more persons are to be treated as a
single person for purposes of contribution.' '41 The legislative history is
silent on the appropriate instances for invoking this provision. The Uni-
form Comparative Fault Act has no similar provision.4 2
Vicarious liability, such as the liability of a master for a servant, is a
likely case for application of this provision. Other jurisdictions consider-
ing the relationship between vicarious liability and contribution treat the
liability of the vicariously liable party as coextensive with that of the ac-
tive tort-feasor in apportioning fault.43 For example, a master and servant
38. Compare id. § 4.22.005 (stating that contributory fault reduces plaintiff's recovery against
tort-feasor) with id. § 4.22.040 (stating that basis for contribution is comparative fault of tort-feasor).
Both of these sections use the definition of "fault" found in RCW § 4.22.015.
39. Id. § 4.22.015; see Comment, Products-Liability-Washington Refuses to Allow Compara-
tive Negligence to Reduce a Strict Liability Award, 56 WASH. L. REV. 307, 315-16 (1981) (criticiz-
ing consideration of the nature of the tort-feasor's conduct).
40. SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 20-21, reprinted in 1981 WASH. S. JOUR. 627. The draf-
ters of the Act wished to make clear that comparison of fault should occur in all cases short of inten-
tional torts. The Committee Report states:
A major goal of this tort reform movement has been to arrive at a fairer apportionment of fault
in tort actions. There has been growing dissatisfaction with the all-or-nothing recovery rules
under the prior law. In view of this, there is considerable support for the position that compara-
tive principles should be applied regardless of the degree offault involved on either side.
Id. (emphasis added). The Committee felt that Washington's 1973 Comparative Fault Act was am-
biguous inasmuch as it did not state whether fault other than simple negligence should reduce plain-
tiff's recoveries. Id.
41. WASH. REv. CODE§4.22.040(1) (1981).
42. Compare id. with UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 4(a), 12 U.L.A. 40 (Supp. 1982).
43. E.g., Hut v. Antonio, 95 N.J. Super. 62, 229 A.2d 823, 827 (Law Div. 1967) (holding that
active tort-feasor cannot obtain contribution from person vicariously liable for active tort-feasor's
wrongdoing); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 876(b) (West 1980) ("Where one or more persons are held
liable solely for the tort of one of them or of another, as in the case of the liability of a master for the
tort of his servant, they shall contribute a single pro rata share .... ). This approach is consistent
with other cases indentifying the vicarious party's liability with the active tort-feasor's. E.g., Hunter
v. Embree, 122 Ga. App. 576, 178 S.E.2d 221, 222 (1970) (principal discharged by unsuccessful
action against agent, even though not party to that action); Smith v. Lincoln, 52 Misc. 2d 66, 275
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are liable between them for only the servant's conduct. Because vicarious
liability is based on the relationship between the actual tort-feasor and
some other party responsible for the tort-feasor's conduct, assigning sepa-
rate shares of liability to each is illogical. Unfairness would result as well
because the vicariously liable party would be liable for the active party's
share as well as her own. The Tort Reform Act allows the court to avoid
this result by treating the active tort-feasor and the vicariously liable party
as one person when allocating fault.
4. Retention of Joint and Several Liability
The Act provides that when multiple tort-feasors are liable on an indi-
visible claim, "the liability of such persons shall be joint and several."44
Most states allowing contribution have retained joint and several liabil-
ity.4 5 Nevertheless, this retention is inconsistent with the principles un-
derlying contribution among tort-feasors. The purpose of contribution is
to provide for liability in proportion to fault.4 6 Requiring any tort-feasor
to pay more than the percentage of harm the tort-feasor is assigned by the
finder of fact is inconsistent with this purpose. 47 This might be the result,
N.Y.S.2d 74, 75 (1966) (master's liability based solely on principle of respondeat superior master
and servant are not joint tort-feasors); Craven v. Lawson, 534 S.W.2d 653, 656 (Tenn. App. 1976)
(where general rule is that release of one tort-feasor releases no others, release of active tort-feasor
releases party vicariously liable for that party's wrongdoing).
Authority to the contrary exists, however. E.g., Alaska Airlines v. Sweat, 568 P.2d 916, 929-30
(Alaska 1977) (holding that the release of an active tort-feasor does not release a party vicariously
liable for the tort-feasor's conduct); Holve v. Draper, 95 Idaho 193, 505 P.2d 1265, 1267 (1973)
(same). This approach was followed in Washington in Finney v. Farmer's Ins. Co., 92 Wn. 2d 748.
754. 600 P.2d 1272, 1276 (1979). The court in Finner reasoned that covenants not to sue do not
release other tort-feasors unless there is danger of double recovery. Nevertheless, the Finnev decision
does not bar allocation of a single share of liability to active tort-feasors and vicariously liable parties
together. Contribution was not an issue in Finnev.
44. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.030 (1981).
45. E.g., American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 588, 578 P.2d 899,
905, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 188 (1978); Kelly v. Long Island Lighting Co., 31 N.Y.2d 25, 30, 286
N.E.2d 241, 243, 334 N.Y.S.2d 851, 855 (1972); Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d
105, 107 (1962). Contra Brown v. Keill, 224 Kan. 195, 580 P.2d 867, 874 (1978) (abolishing joint
and several liability in Kansas comparative negligence actions).
Twenty other states have adopted either the 1939 or 1955 version of the Uniform Contribution
Among Tortfeasors Act, both of which retained joint and several liability. See 12 U.L.A. 52 (Supp.
1982); see also UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 4 commissioners' comment, 12 U.L.A. 41 (Supp.
1982) (stating that Uniform Comparative Fault Act retains joint and several liability).
46. See American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 598, 578 P.2d 899.
911-12, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 194-195 (1978); Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 148-49.
282 N.E.2d 288, 292, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 387 (1972); Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d
105, 109 (1962); SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 21-24, reprinted in 1981 WASH. S. JOUR.
627-28.
47. There is nothing inherently fair about a defendant who is 10% at fault paying 100% of the
loss. and there is no social policy that should compel defendants to pay more than their fair share
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for example, if one defendant were judgment proof because of insolvency
or immunity. Retaining joint and several liability in effect penalizes a
solvent tort-feasor for the insolvency of another, penalizes a tort-feasor
whose co-tort-feasor is married to the injured plaintiff, and penalizes a
tort-feasor because a co-tort-feasor is immune from liability under the
Federal Tort Claims Act, worker's compensation law, or some other
source of immunity. In short, the solvent, non-immune tort-feasor is bur-
dened with the risk that a fellow tort-feasor is immune or judgment proof.
Justification-for retaining joint and several liability rests on the superior
equitable rights of the plaintiff compared with the rights of those at fault.
The plaintiff's right to a full and rapid recovery takes precedence over
tort-feasors' rights to allocate liability among themselves in proportion to
fault. The drafters of the Tort Reform Act found this priority sufficient
reason, when combined with the ameliorating effects of contribution, to
retain joint and several liability. 48
The priority accorded plaintiffs is consistent with Washington pre-
cedent. In Seattle First National Bank v. Shoreline Concrete Co., 4 9 the
Washington Supreme Court stated:
The cornerstone of tort law is the assurance of full compensation to the in-
jured party. To attain this goal, the procedural aspect of our rule permits the
injured party to seek full recovery from any one or all of such tort-feasors.
. . .What may be equitable between multiple tort-feasors is an issue totally
divorced from what is fair to the injured party. 50
The superior rights of the plaintiff have provided the rationale for re-
tention of joint and several liability in other jurisdictions as well. 51
of the loss. Plaintiffs now take the parties as they find them. If one of the parties at fault happens
to be a spouse or a governmental agency and if by reason of some competing social policy the
plaintiff cannot receive payment for his injuries from the spouse or agency, there is no compel-
ling social policy which requires the codefendant to pay more than his fair share of the loss. The
same is true if one of the defendants is wealthy and the other is not.
Brown v. Keill, 224 Kan. 195, 580 P.2d 867, 874 (1978) (abolishing joint and several liability); see
also Comment, Contribution and Indemnity Collide with Comparative Negligence-The New Doc-
trine of Equitable Indemnity, 18 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 779, 804 (1978) (criticizing Califomia's
retention of joint and several liability).
48. SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 23, reprinted in 1981 WASH. S. JOUR. 628:
The Committee believes that the rule on joint and several liability should continue to be recog-
nized in this state. It concedes that the effect of this rule may be to require a partially at fault
defendant to pay more than his or her share of the joint defendants' liability in certain cases. This
unfairness should be ameliorated in most cases by the creation of a right of contribution among
tortfeasors. In those cases where it is not, the Committee feels that a defendant rather than the
plaintiff should bear the burden of that unfairness.
49. 91 Wn. 2d230,588P.2d 1308 (1978).
50. Id. at 236, 588 P.2d at 1312-13.
51. E.g., Arctic Structures, Inc. v. Wedmore, 605 P.2d 426, 435 (Alaska 1979); American Mo-
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Retaining joint and several liability also is consistent with Washing-
ton's comparative negligence law, which was designed to achieve greater
fairness in tort law by increasing the chance of recovery for a contributo-
rially negligent plaintiff.52 Contribution among tort-feasors creates
greater fairness for the tort-feasors by allowing them to apportion fault. 53
A good argument can be made that treating tort-feasors more fairly should
not result in decreasing the chances of recoveries by injured plaintiffs. 54
II. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF CONTRIBUTION IN
WASHINGTON
Section 13 of the Tort Reform Act provides elaborate procedural rules
governing enforcement of the right to contribution. 55 This section exam-
ines those rules.
A. Joint Judgment Not a Prerequisite to Contribution
Early contribution rights in other states sometimes required a joint and
several judgment before one tort-feasor could seek contribution from an-
other. 56 Washington's Act provides a right to contribution when two per-
sons are "jointly and severally liable" on the same claim. 57 Because the
tort-feasors are not liable until a judgment is entered against them, logi-
cally no right of contribution exists until then. This interpretation yields
preposterous results, however. For instance, a Montana court held that
one tort-feasor could not implead another into the original action.5 8 This
interpretation defeats a central purpose of contribution: to make those re-
torcycle Ass'n. v. Superior Court. 20 Cal. 3d 578, 589-90, 578 P.2d 899. 906, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182.
189 (1978); Walker v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 214 Wis. 519,252 N.W. 721.728 (1934).
52. Seattle First Nat'l Bank v. Shoreline Concrete Co., 91 Wn. 2d 230. 236. 588 P.2d 1308.
1313 (1978).
53. SENATE REPORT. supra note 7. at 24, reprinted in 1981 WAsH.,S. JOUR. 628.
54. The Washington Supreme Court stated that abolition of joint and several liability would be
-completely inconsistent" with the comparative negligence rule. Seattle First Nat'l Bank v. Shore-
line Concrete Co., 91 Wn. 2d 230, 236-37, 588 P.2d 1308. 1313 (1978).
55. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.050 (1981). This section is identical to section 5 of the Uniform
Comparative Fault Act, except for the substitution of the term "comparative fault- for "'proportion-
ate fault.' Compare id. with UNIF. COMPARATIvE FAULT AcT § 5. 12 U.L.A. 41 (Supp. 1982).
56. E.g.. Thornton v. Luce, 209 Cal. App. 2d 542, 26 Cal. Rptr. 393. 398 (1963): Consolidated
Freightways Corp. v. Osier. 605 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Mont. 1979): Miraglia v. Miraglia. 106 N.J.
Super. 266. 255 A.2d 762. 765 (App. Div. 1969); Lurie v. Goldman, 53 Misc. 2d 250. 278
N.Y.S.2d 549. 550 (Sup. Ct. 1965). An example of the problems this approach created is Sonnenthal
v. Hodes, I I A.D.2d 645, 201 N.Y.S.2d 547. 548 (1960) (tort-feasor could preclude a separate trial
against other tort-feasors to preserve right to contribution because joint judgment necessary),
57. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.040(1981).
58. Consolidated Freightways Corp. v. Osier, 605 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Mont. 1979).
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sponsible for harm pay for it, regardless of whom the plaintiff elects to
sue.
Washington's statute avoids this interpretation by providing that the
right of contribution exists "whether or not judgment has been recovered
against all or any of [the tort-feasors]. 59 The right to contribution is not
fully established until a tort-feasor pays more than that tort-feasor's pro-
portionate share of the liability. Other jurisdictions have characterized the
contribution right existing prior to payment as "inchoate," ripening into
a cause of action when one tort-feasor pays more than the appropriate
share. 6° These courts allow the inchoate contribution rights to be adjudi-
cated before entry of judgment or payment so that proportional shares are
fixed when the full contribution rights are established by payment.
B. Allocation of Fault When All Tort-feasors Are Named in the Original
Action
If the plaintiff names all tort-feasors in the original action, the court
may apportion fault for purposes of contribution in that action. The Tort
Reform Act provides that contribution "may be enforced ... in the origi-
nal action.' '61 This implies that the court in the original action may not
only enforce contribution but may also apportion fault. The comments to
the parallel section of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act support this
implication. 62 Because the court may now allocate fault among defen-
dants, multiparty trials, will be longer and the fact-finder's task more com-
plicated. 63
59. WAsH. REv. CODE § 4.22.040(1) (1981).
60. E.g., Albert v. Deitz, 283 F. Supp. 854, 856-57 (D. Hawaii 1968) (applying Hawaii law).
Other jurisdictions employ a similar approach. E.g., Douglas v. Sheridan, 26 N.J. Super. 544, 98
A.2d 632, 633-34 (Law Div. 1953); Board of Educ. v. Stanhardt, 80 N.M. 543, 458 P.2d 795, 799
(1969).
61. WAsH. REV. CODE § 4.22.040(1) (1981). The procedural rule provides that once allocation is
made in the original action, a party paying more than that party's equitable share may move for
contribution. Id. § 4.22.050(1). This motion could only occur after trial because contribution rights
do not accrue until a party has paid more than that party's share.
62. See, e.g., UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT Acr § 5 commissioners' comment, illustration 9, 12
U.L.A. 41 (Supp. 1982):
A sues B and C ....
A is found 40% at fault.
B isfound30% at fault.
C isfound30% atfault.
A, with a joint-and-several judgment for $6,000 against B and C, collects the whole amount
from B.
On proper motion to the court, B is entitled to contribution from C in the amount of $3,000.
(emphasis added).
63. For an example of the problems involved in allocating fault between tort-feasors, see Lieb-
man v. County of Westchester, 71 Misc. 2d 997, 337 N.Y.S.2d 164, 174 (Sup. Ct. 1972) (holding
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C. When All Tort-feasors Are Not Named: Third-Party Actions
The Tort Reform Act does not address the right of a tort-feasor to insti-
tute a third-party action against a potential contributor, although legisla-
tive history indicates this was an intended result. 64 If impleader is al-
lowed, the court can allocate fault to the third-party defendant in the
original action, thereby disposing of all the litigation in a single trial. The
right to implead a potential contributor is consistent with the rest of the
Act and with the court rule allowing impleader. 65
Allowing impleader is also consistent with the "inchoate contribution
rights" approach discussed above. 66 The tort-feasor seeking to implead
has no right to contribution until the tort-feasor proves that the third-party
defendant was partly at fault for the plaintiff's injuries and until the tort-
feasor pays the third-party's share of the damages. The court rule govern-
ing third-party actions67 allows impleader of someone who "is or may be
liable" for part of the plaintiff's claim. A potential contributor "may be
liable" if the original defendant can prove that the potential contributor
was at fault in causing the plaintiff's injury.
The Washington Supreme Court favors liberal use of the court rule to
avoid multiple suits, and has stated in dictum that impleader is appropri-
ate to enforce contribution. 68 Most jurisdictions with similar third-party
action rules allow impleader of potentially liable parties to enforce contri-
bution. 69 This view is consistent with the purpose of contribution to make
liability more dependent on fault and less dependent on whom the plain-
tiff elects to sue. 70
that, under New York's contribution statute, the jury must first apportion fault between plaintiff and
original defendants as a group, then between original defendants, then between each original defen-
dant and that defendant's third-party defendants), rev'd on other grounds, 41 AD. 2d 756, 341
N.Y.S.2d 567 (1973).
The adoption of contribution will also increase the volume of litigation courts must handle. See
Fisher v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. App. 3d 434, 440, 163 Cal. Rptr. 47, 51 (1980) (noting that since
California's adoption of contribution, "the superior courts of our state have been deluged with cross-
complaints for comparative (equitable) indemnity between alleged joint tortfeasors").
64. SENATE REPORT, supra note7, at 50-51, reprinted in 1981 WASH. S. JoUt. 636.
65. See WASH. SUPER. CT. CIv. R. 14(a).
66. See notes 56-60 and accompanying text supra.
67. WASH. SUPER. CT. Ctv. R. 14(a).
68. Deutsch v. West Coast Mach. Co., 80 Wn. 2d 707, 718, 497 P.2d 1311, 1317, cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1009 (1972). The court could sever the third-party action under Superior Court Civil Rule
42(b) if convenience or justice required. SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 51, reprinted in 1981
WASH. S. JOUR. 636.
69. See. e.g., Tamashiro v. DeGama, 51 Hawaii 74, 450 P.2d 998, 1002 (1969); Douglas v.
Sheridan, 26 N.J. Super. 544, 98 A.2d 632, 634 (Law Div. 1953); Board of Educ. v. Stanhardt, 80
N.M. 543, 458 P.2d 795, 799 (1969); Stein v. Whitehead, 40 A.D.2d 89, 337 N.Y.S.2d 821, 824
(1972). Contra Consolidated Freightways Corp. v. Osier, 605 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Mont. 1979).
70. See Lipson v. Gerwitz, 70 Misc. 2d 599, 334 N.Y.S. 2d 662, 664 (Nassau County Dist. Ct.




D. Separate Actions to Enforce Contribution
Contribution may be enforced in a separate action if all tort-feasors are
not parties to the original action or if a tort-feasor does not implead a
potential contributor.71 The separate action may be brought against the
potential contributor even if no judgment has been rendered against the
person seeking contribution. 72
A tort-feasor must commence the separate action to enforce contribu-
tion within one year of the final judgment, payment, or settlement of the
injured party's suit.73 The apparent74 purpose of this limitation on the
right to seek contribution is to put an end to litigation arising out of an
accident.75
Another effect of the provision is to allow a tort-feasor seeking contri-
bution to commence a suit beyond the statute of limitations period appli-
cable to the plaintiff's original claim. For example, if a plaintiff sued near
71. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.050(2) (1981):
If the comparative fault of the parties to the claim for contribution has not been established by
the court in the original action, contribution may be enforced in a separate action, whether or not
a judgment has been rendered against either the person seeking contribution or the person from
whom contribution is being sought.
Accord Stein v. Whitehead, 40 A.D.2d 89, 337 N.Y.S.2d 821, 824-25 (1972); see also WASH. REV.
CODE § 4.22.040(1) (1981) (stating that contribution "may be enforced... in... a separate action
brought for that purpose"); UNIF. COMPARATIvE FAULT Acr § 5 commissioners' comment, illustra-
tion 10, 12 U.L.A. 41 (Supp. 1982) (giving example of contribution enforcement in separate action).
72. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.050(2) (1981). This provision covers at least two situations. In the
first, the original defendant wishes to bring the contribution action contemporaneously in a separate
court. The court in the separate action would apportion fault between the tort-feasors, but that fault
would not ripen into a judgment against the potential contributor until the person seeking contribution
paid the original plaintiff. See note 60 supra (disctissing inchoate contribution rights). Combining the
two actions to dispose of the whole case in one trial would be preferable.
In the second situation, the original defendant settles with the plaintiff, then wishes to force an-
other tort-feasor to contribute to the settlement. This would be permissible because a judgment
against the person seeking contribution is unnecessary under the statute.
73. WASH. REv. CODE § 4.22.050(3) (1981). This provision should avoid the problems other
jurisdictions have encountered in deciding when the statute of limitations should expire in contribu-
tion actions. See, e.g., Albert v. Deitz, 283 F. Supp. 854, 857 (D. Hawaii 1968) (applying Hawaii
law) (holding that cause of action for contribution does not arise until payment by one tort-feasor, so
six-month limitation on claims against county does not bar contribution action against county more
than six months after accident); Markey v. Skog, 129 N.J. Super. 192, 322 A.2d 513, 518 (Ch. Div.
1974) (holding that running of statute of limitations on injured plaintiffs claim against defendant
does not bar third-party contribution action arising out of same accident).
74. Legislative history does not discuss the purpose of this provision.
75. This policy is in accord with Washington law on statutes of limitations. See Summerise v.
Stephens, 75 Wn. 2d 808, 811, 454 P.2d 224, 226 (1969) (stating that statutes of limitations force
actions to trial while evidence still exists and witnesses remember incident); Ruth v. Dight, 75 Wn.
2d 660, 664-66, 453 P.2d 631, 634 (1969) (stating that statutes of limitations protect people from
"unending harassment of judicial process"); Voelker v. Joseph, 62 Wn. 2d 429, 435, 383 P.2d 301,
305-06 (1963) (stating that statutes of limitations are legislative delineation of reasonable time limits
for bringing suit).
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the end of the applicable statute of limitations, two years elapsed before
judgment or settlement, and the defendant then sued a potential contribu-
tor within one year after the judgment or settlement, then the contributor
would be forced to defend an action arising out of an accident nearly three
years after the statute of limitations had elapsed. The statute of limitations
would bar a direct action by the injured party, but would not bar the con-
tribution action by the tort-feasor. 76
E. Retroactive Applicability
The Act provides for limited retroactive application of the contribution
scheme. The contribution sections apply to all cases in which "trial on
the underlying action" had not taken place before July 26, 1981. 77 The
Act does not define "underlying action," which presents numerous prob-
lems. For example, the plaintiff's trial against one defendant may have
begun before July 26, but another defendant may have been brought into
the action later. Or a trial on liability may have occurred before July 26,
but the trial on damages occurred later. Or a trial may have been con-
cluded before July 26, but an appeal is pending so the judgment is not
final and remand is possible. The result in these cases is uncertain. Sena-
tor Talmadge, a major force in the Act's passage, opined that contribution
would apply in any action where judgment was not entered before July
26, 1981 .78 No right of contribution exists in favor of or against anyone
who settled with the plaintiff before July 26, 1981.79
III. CONTRIBUTION AND SETTLEMENTS
Settlements between parties often create difficulties in applying contri-
bution. The Tort Reform Act contains elaborate provisions on the interac-
tion between settlements and contribution. This section analyzes those
provisions and concludes that the courts should construe strictly the pro-
visions that permit disapproval of "unreasonable" settlements. This strict
construction should insure that injured plaintiffs receive full recoveries.
Strict construction will also provide incentives to settle, an essential part
of a functional tort litigation system.
76. Extension of the statute of limitations for contribution actions is necessary to prevent the
plaintiff from interfering with the defendant's contribution rights by filing the action near the end of
the statute of limitations period.
77. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.920(2) (1981).
78. Talmadge. Washington's Product Liability Act. 5 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 1.21 (19811.





The effect of settlements on the rights of plaintiffs and nonsettling tort-
feasors has undergone many changes in Washington. Washington courts
initially embraced the common-law rule that the release of one tort-feasor
released all tort-feasors liable for the same injury. 80 This rule often
worked hardships on plaintiffs who entered into releases unaware of the
rule. To mitigate this hardship, Washington courts recognized covenants
not to sue, which discharged the tort-feasor who paid for the covenant but
did not discharge any others. 81 Whether a settlement agreement was a
release or a covenant not to sue depended on the effect of the agreement,
the consideration, and the circumstances surrounding its execution. 82 The
parties' recitals were inconclusive. 83
The courts further ameliorated the harshness of the common-law rule
by holding that a release of one tort-feasor did not release a "successive"
tort-feasor, that is, one acting independently who caused a segregable
harm. 84 The Washington Supreme Court later held that the release of one
tort-feasor released only "joint" tort-feasors, those acting in concert with
the released tort-feasor.85 Finally, the courts decided that when indepen-
dent negligent acts created any injury, tort-feasors not parties to a settle-
ment were released only if the plaintiff so intended or if the consideration
given for the settlement fully satisfied the claim.8 6
80. See, e.g., Pinkham Lumber Co. v. Woodland State Bank, 156 Wash. 117, 131, 286 P. 95,
98 (1930); Martin v. Cunningham, 93 Wash. 517, 520-21,161 P. 355,357 (1916) (panel), aff'd en
banc, 97 Wash. 699, 166 P. 793 (1917); Abb v. Northern Pac. Ry., 28 Wash. 428, 438, 68 P. 954,
957 (1902). The rationale for the rule was that the injury is indivisible, so the plaintiff could not
divide it by releasing one tort-feasor to the exclusion of others. Id. at 431,68 P. at 955.
81. See, e.g., Randall v. Gerrick, 93 Wash. 522, 528-29, 161 P. 357, 359 (1916), modifiedon
other grounds, 99 Wash. 696, 169 P. 806 (1918).
82. Richardson v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 11 Wn. 2d 288, 317, 118 P.2d 985, 998 (1941);
Haney v. Cheatham, 8 Wn. 2d 310, 318, 111 P.2d 1003, 1006 (1941); Rust v. Schlaitzer, 175 Wash.
331, 336, 27 P.2d 571,573 (1933).
83. Courts, looking favorably on covenants not to sue, gave more weight to the intent of the
parties than the circumstances and effect of the agreement. A common statement was that:
The correct rule adopted by this court is that the distinction between a covenant not to sue and a
release will be preserved according to the intention of the parties, unless the document is opera-
tive as a release because (1) a reasonably compensatory consideration has been paid by a code-
fendant (2) for the alleged tort (3) to (for the benefit of) the party plaintiff who gives the coven-
ant not to sue.
Mills v. Inter Island Tel. Co., 68 Wn: 2d 820, 829, 416 P.2d 115, 121 (1966).
84. DeNike v. Mowery, 69 Wn. 2d 357, 369-70,418 P.2d 1010, 1017-18(1966).
85. White Pass Co. v. St. John, 71 Wn. 2d 156, 158, 427 P.2d 398, 399 (1967). This decision
precluded application of the common-law rule in most tort suits because few tort-feasors act in con-
cert to cause harm.
86. See Callan v. O'Neil, 20 Wn. App. 32, 35, 578 P.2d 890, 892 (1978); Litts v. Pierce
County, 5 Wn. App. 531,538,488 P.2d 785, 790 (1971).
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B. Settlements Under the Act
The Tort Reform Act eliminates the confusing rules governing settle-
ments by providing a uniform settlement procedure. Any agreement that
extinguishes the liability of any party, however labelled, has the same
effect on the contribution rights and liabilities of the tort-feasors. Both
covenants not to sue and releases are now called "settlement agree-
ments." 8 7 The consequences of these agreements are discussed below.
1. The Rights of Settling Tort-feasors
A settling tort-feasor can obtain contribution only if the agreement with
the plaintiff also extinguished the potential contributor's liability to the
plaintiff. 88 This protects nonsettling tort-feasors from the possibility of
double liability to both the settling tort-feasor and the plaintiff. Contribu-
tion is allowed "to the extent that the amount paid in settlement was rea-
sonable at the time of the settlement.' '89 If the amount is unreasonably
large, the nonsettling tort-feasor may have the amount of contribution re-
duced to a reasonable amount. Retrospective reasonableness is not re-
quired. 90 This is a sensible provision, given the delays and uncertainties
of tort litigation.
Settlements by a tort-feasor bar all liability for contribution to nonset-
tling tort-feasors. 91 This provision is laudable 92 because it provides an
incentive to settle by insuring that settling tort-feasors will not be subject
to further liability. 93
87. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.060 (1981).
88. Id. § 4.22.040(2).
89. Id. This "reasonable amount" presumably would be determined by the trier of fact in the
contribution action. See W.D. Rubright Co. v. International Harvester Co., 358 F. Supp. 1388, 1392
(W.D. Pa. 1973).
90. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.040(2) (1981).
91. Id. § 4.22.060(2). This provision is consistent with most other contribution statutes and com-
mon-law systems of contribution. See Pilosky v. Dougherty, 179 F. Supp. 148, 150 (E.D. Pa. 1959);
American Motorcycle Ass'n. v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 603, 578 P.2d 899, 915, 146 Cal.
Rptr. 182, 198 (1978); Madaffari v. Wilmod Co., 96 Misc. 2d 729, 409 N.Y.S.2d 587, 589 (Sup.
Ct. 1978); UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS AcT § 4(b), 12 U.L.A. 98 (1955).
92. Courts have recognized that settlements are a necessary part of the tort litigation system,
inasmuch as the court system could not possibly try all the suits presently filed. E.g., Reichenbach v.
Smith, 528 F.2d 1072, 1074 (5th Cir. 1976) ("With today's burgeoning dockets and the absolute
impossibility of Courts ever beginning to think that they might even be able to hear every case, the
cause of justice is advanced by settlement compromises .... ); see also Lynch, Settlement of Civil
Cases: A View from the Bench, 5 LITIGATION 8, 8 (1978) (noting importance of settlement confer-
ences as means to reduce backlog in court calendars). Washington courts favor settlements as well.
See, e.g., Pepper v. Evanson, 70 Wn. 2d 309, 314, 422 P.2d 817, 820 (1967); Beaver v. Estate of
Harris, 67 Wn. 2d 621,627,409 P.2d 143, 147 (1965).
93. The California Supreme Court has said: " 'Few things would be better calculated to . ..
discourage settlements of disputed tort claims, than knowledge that such a settlement lacked finality
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The Act is ambiguous on whether the settling tort-feasor's liability for
contribution is extinguished if the court refuses to approve the settlement.
The Act requires court approval of settlements proposed after a suit is
filed. 94 This could imply that if the court rejects a settlement, or if ap-
proval is not sought, then the settling tort-feasor remains liable for contri-
bution. This view should be rejected for two reasons. First, the Act does
not limit the discharge from contribution liability to approved settle-
ments. 95 Second, the Act indicates that all settlements, approved or not,
are valid between the settling parties: "A determination that the amount
paid for a release . . . or similar agreement was unreasonable shall not
affect the validity of the agreement between the released-and releasing
persons .... ,"96
2. The Rights ofNonsettling Tort-feasors
Nonsettling tort-feasors are discharged only if the agreement so pro-
vides. 97 Thus, the Act abolishes the common-law rule that the release of
one tort-feasor releases all.
Careful drafting of settlement agreements is important to avoid inad-
vertent forfeiture of rights under the Act. If the plaintiff wishes to settle a
claim against only one tort-feasor, the settlement should name that tort-
feasor only and should not employ general release language. The Wash-
ington Supreme Court has construed general release language to prohibit
all actions arising out of the transaction originally sued upon. 98 If, on the
and would lead to further litigation with one's joint tortfeasors, and perhaps further liability.' "
American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 604, 578 P.2d 899, 915-16, 146
Cal. Rptr. 182, 198-99 (1978) (quoting Stambaugh v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. App. 3d 231, 236,
132 Cal. Rptr. 843, 846 (1976)). Other courts have voiced similar thoughts. E.g., Pilosky v.
Dougherty, 179 F. Supp. 148, 150 (E.D. Penn. 1959); Mielcarek v. Knights, 50 A.D.2d 122, 375
N.Y.S.2d 922, 927 (1975); see also UNIF. COMPARAIVE FAULT Acr § 6 commissioners' comment,
12 U.L.A. 42 (Supp. 1982) (noting that a chief disadvantage of the 1939 Uniform Contribution
Among Tortfeasors Act, which often did not discharge settling tort-feasors from liability for contribu-
tion, was that it discouraged settlements).
94. WASH. REv. CODE § 4.22.060(1) (1981).
95. See id. § 4.22.060(2).
96. Id. § 4.22.060(3) (1981). Discharging the settling tort-feasor from contribution liability,
even if the settlement was unreasonably low, does not prejudice the nonsettling tort-feasors. The
court can reduce their aggregate liability to the plaintiff so they are not penalized by the unreasonably
low settlement, See notes 113-114 and accompanying text infra (discussing effect of determination
that settlement was unreasonably low).
97. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.060(2) (1981).
98. Bakamus v. Albert, I Wn. 2d 241, 251, 95 P.2d 767, 770-71 (1939); Bonar v. Hopkins,
453 F.2d 1361, 1361 (3d Cir. 1970) (per curiam); Hasselrode v. Gnagey, 404 Pa. 549, 172 A.2d
764, 765 (1961). But see Hawaiian Ins. & Guar. Co. v. Mead, 14 Wn. App. 43, 53, 538 P.2d 865,




other hand, the plaintiff wishes to settle the entire claim with only one of
many tort-feasors, the settlement agreement should release all the poten-
tial contributors by name so that the settling tort-feasor can seek contribu-
tion from the others. 99 While general release language should suffice to
release the potential contributors, one court has held that a settlement
agreement must release a potential contributor by name before contribu-
tion from her was possible. 100
If nonsettling tort-feasors are not released, their aggregate liability is
reduced by the amount paid for the settlement. 101 This provision prevents
the plaintiff from obtaining excessive recoveries because the plaintiff can
never recover more than the amount of damages determined by the finder
of fact. Reduction of aggregate liability should also prevent the plaintiff
from obtaining excessive recovery by settling for large amounts with all
tort-feasors. A nonsettling tort-feasor has more bargaining power in set-
tlement negotiations if the verdict against the nonsettler would be reduced
at trial by amounts received in settlement. This increase in bargaining
power should keep settlements reasonable.
A question exists whether aggregate liability should be reduced if a
settling defendant is found not to be liable at trial. If reduction of recovery
depends on whether the settling defendant is at fault, the trier of fact must
determine whether that fault exists even though the settling defendant is
no longer a party to the action and even though no recovery from him is
possible. The majority of jurisdictions reduce the aggregate liability of
the nonsettlers by amounts received in settlement despite the settling de-
fendant's lack of fault.10 2 A minority does not reduce liability, reasoning
that because the settling defendant is not liable, that defendant is not
within contribution statutes permitting reductions for settlements by
"joint tort-feasors." 103 Washington should follow the majority approach.
99. The settlement agreement must discharge the liability of potential contributors before the
settling tort-feasor can seek contribution from them. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.040(2) (1981): see
notes 88-90 and accompanying text supra.
100. United States v. Reilly, 385 F.2d 225,229 (10th Cir. 1967).
101. This is consistent with prior Washington law. See, e.g., White Pass Co. v. St. John, 71 Wn.
2d 156, 160, 427 P.2d 398,400 (1967); Mills v. Inter Island Tel. Co., 68 Wn. 2d 820, 829. 416 P.2d
115, 121 (1966); Litts v. Pierce County, 5 Wn. App. 531, 538, 488 P.2d 785. 790 (1971); see also
American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 604, 578 P.2d 899, 916, 146 Cal.
Rptr. 182. 199 (1978); McGee v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 82 Cal. App. 3d 1005, 1022, 147 Cal. Rptr.
694, 704-05 (1978).
102. See, e.g., Vesey v. United States, 626 F.2d 627, 632-33 (9th Cir. 1980) (applying Califor-
nia law); Werner v. Our Lady of Lourdes, 60 A.D.2d 791, 400 N.Y.S.2d 659. 660 (1977); Degen v.
Bayman, 90 S.D. 400, 241 N.W.2d 703, 707 (1976); Yett v. Smoky Mountain Aviation. Inc.. 555
S.W.2d 867, 869 (Tenn. App. 1977).
103. See, e.g., Maryland Lumber Co. v. White, 205 Md. 180, 107 A.2d 73, 81 (1954); Eckels
v. Klieger, 205 Pa. Super. 526, 210 A.2d 899,901-02 (1965).
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This approach prevents overcompensation of the plaintiff and avoids a
time-consuming inquiry into the negligence of the settling defendant. 104
The provision reducing liability is the Washington Act's only substan-
tial departure from the Uniform Comparative Fault Act. In Washington,
the aggregate liability of the nonsettling tort-feasors is reduced by the ac-
tual amount paid by the settling tort-feasors. Under the Uniform Act, the
reduction is by the percentage of comparative fault of the settling tort-
feasor. 105
The Washington approach is reasonable. First, it does not affect a
plaintiff's right to obtain a full recovery, which is an important policy in
Washington. 106 Reducing liability by percentage fault of the settling tort-
feasor under the Uniform Act would not necessarily provide full dollar
recovery. For instance, suppose one of two tort-feasors settles for
$10,000 but is found liable for one-half of the plaintiff's $40,000 claim.
Because the nonsettling tort-feasor's liability is reduced by the percentage
fault of the settler under the Uniform Act, the plaintiff can recover only
$20,000 from the nonsettler. The plaintiff therefore recovers only
$30,000 of a $40,000 verdict. Washington's Act avoids this result be-
cause the nonsettler's liability is reduced by only the $10,000 previously
received in settlement.
Second, the Washington Act's assurance of full recovery furnishes
more incentive to the plaintiff to settle than does the Uniform Act ap-
proach.107 The possibility that the plaintiff's total recovery might be di-
minished under the Uniform Act would create a disincentive to settle.
104. The majority approach avoids overcompensating the plaintiff because the verdict against the
nonsettling actual tort-feasors is reduced by all amounts previously received in settlement. An inquiry
into the settling defendant's negligence is unnecessary because the verdict is reduced whether or not
the settler was liable.
Reducing aggregate liability is further complicated when the plaintiff is found at fault. In Califor-
nia, the plaintiff's negligence first reduces the total damages verdict. The amount paid by the settling
defendants is then subtracted from the aggregate liability of the nonsettlers. See Lemos v. Eichel, 83
Cal. App. 3d 117, 118-19, 147 Cal. Rptr. 603,607 (1978).
105. See UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAuLT Acr § 6, 12 U.L.A. 42 (Supp. 1982). For example, assume
A, B, and C are equally at fault for plaintiff's injuries. Plaintiffs damages are $60,000. A settles for
$10,000. Under the Washington approach, B and C are liable for $50,000 because their aggregate
liability is reduced only by amounts paid in settlement. Under the Uniform Act approach, their liabil-
ity is limited to $40,000, because the verdict is reduced by the 33% comparative fault of the settling
tort-feasor.
106. "The first and prevailing principle emanates from the fundamental reason for awarding
damages for wrongfully inflicted personal injury: that the injured person ought to be made as nearly
whole as possible through pecuniary compensation. This principle is really the basic underpinning of
all tort law." DeNike v. Mowery, 69 Wn. 2d 357, 371,418 P.2d 1010, 1019 (1966); see also Hawai-
ian Ins. & Guar. Co. v. Mead, 14 Wn. App. 43, 57, 538 P.2d 865, 873 (1975) ("[T]he law strongly
favors the just compensation of accident victims").
107. The Act's drafters adopted this provision to encourage settlements:
This section differs from the Uniform Comparative Fault Act in that the final judgment of the
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Nevertheless, the approach of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act is
defensible. First, no tort-feasor is forced to pay more than her proportion-
ate share of the damages. 108 Second, this approach eliminates the danger
of collusion between the settling defendant and the plaintiff. The plaintiff
will not settle for an unreasonably small amount if the plaintiff is penal-
ized by not being able to recover the shortfall from the nonsettlers. Third,
the Uniform Act's approach eliminates any objections nonsettling tort-
feasors might have to the settlement. Their aggregate liability will be re-
duced proportionately, even if this results in an inadequate recovery for
the plaintiff.
Contrasting values underlie these two approaches. Washington's ap-
proach promotes full recovery by plaintiffs and provides incentives for
settlement. The Uniform Comparative Fault Act's approach champions
equitable apportionment of fault among tort-feasors. Because the Wash-
ington approach gives defendants an opportunity to fashion their own
equitable apportionment of fault without endangering the plaintiff's re-
covery, it is preferable.
The Washington approach is also consistent with retention of joint and
several liability. 109 Both principles hold that although defendants have a
right to apportion liability among themselves, that right is inferior to the
plaintiff's right to a full recovery.
3. Court Approval
The Act safeguards nonsettling tort-feasors against unfair settle-
claimant is reduced by the amount paid for a release .. instead of the comparative fault of the
released party as determined in the lawsuit. This approach was decided upon in order not to
discourage parties from settling with claimants.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 54, reprinted in 1981 WASH. S. JOUR. 636; see also UNIF. CONIPAR-
ATIVE FAULT Acr § 5 commissioners' comment, 12 U.L.A. 42 (Supp. 1982) (noting that the ap-
proach used by the Uniform Act may tend to discourage a plaintiff from entering into a settlement);
Wilner & Farrell, Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.: The Kaleidoscopic Impact of a Leading Case, 42
BROOKLYN L. REV. 457 (1976) (noting that New York's law reducing recovery from nonsettlers by
comparative fault of settling tort-feasor is a disincentive to settlements).
108. Under the Washington approach, if the plaintiff settles with one tort-feasor for less than the
tort-feasor's true comparative fault, the nonsettling tort-feasors will pay more than their proportionate
shares without the settlement. Many authorities argue that this is unfair and inconsistent with the
principles of allocating liability in accordance with fault. See, e.g., Bartels v. City of Williston. 276
N.W.2d 113, 121 (N.D. 1979); Poupore v. Seguin, 82 Misc. 2d 1, 267 N.Y.S.2d 950, 951 (Sup. Ct.
1975); UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT AcT § 6 commissioners' comment, 12 U.L.A. 42 (Supp. 1982):
Adler, Allocation of Responsibility After American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court, 6 PEP.
PERDINE L. REV. 1,23-25 (1978); Comment, Settlement in Joint Tort Cases, 18 STAN. L. REV. 486.
492-93 (1966). It forces the nonsettling defendants to bear the burden of the settling tort-feasor's
decision to buy peace. It may also create a race to settle between tort-feasors.
109. See notes 44-54 and accompanying text supra.
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ments. 110 The court must hold a hearing to determine that any settlement
proposed after the suit is filed is reasonable. All parties to the suit may
present evidence on the reasonableness of the settlement. I11
A hearing to determine the reasonableness of any settlement made be-
fore filing may be held on the motion of any party to the action. If the
court determines that the pre-filing settlement was unreasonable, the ag-
gregate liability of the nonsettling tort-feasors is reduced by "an amount
determined by the court to be reasonable." "12 The court's determination
has no effect on the settling defendant the court cannot require additional
payments. 113
The Act provides no guidance on when the reasonableness determina-
tions are appealable. A determination that a pre-filing settlement was un-
reasonable should not be appealable until final judgment is entered in the
suit. 114 Orders cannot be appealed before judgment if they can be cor-
rected on appeal after final judgment. 115 Arguably, denials of approval to
post-filing settlements should be treated differently. Correcting mistaken
disapprovals would be difficult because the litigation the parties sought to
avoid already would have occurred. Courts should nevertheless discour-
age pre-judgment appeals of settlement disapprovals. Such appeals would
rarely be successful because the scope of appellate review is limited," 16
and waiting for appellate review of settlement determinations would slow
resolution of cases at trial.
The Act does not provide guidelines for deciding what is an unreason-
able settlement. The drafters left construction of this term to the courts. 117
110. Settlements are "unfair" when, for example, the plaintiff settles with one tort-feasor for an
unreasonably small amount in order to concentrate litigation efforts on a wealthier defendant or one
less likely to receive jury sympathy, such as a corporation. Allegations of unfair settlement will arise
only when too little consideration is paid so that the nonsettling tort-feasors are liable for a dispropor-
tionately large amount. When a tort-feasor settles for an unreasonably high amount, no one can ob-
ject. The settler buys peace, and cannot complain if later the claim turns out to be worth less than it
appeared. The plaintiff is fully compensated. The aggregate liability of the nonsettling tort-feasors is
reduced because of the settlement.
111. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.060 (1981).
112. Id. § 4.22.060(2). All parties can present evidence bearing on reasonableness of settlement
in this hearing as well.
113. Id. § 4.22.060(3); see notes 94-96 and accompanying text supra (discussing interaction of
this section and the one requiring court approval of settlements).
114. Most court orders are not appealable until final judgment. WASH. R. APP. P. 22.
115. Herrmann v. Cissna, 82 Wn. 2d 1, 3-4, 507 P.2d 144, 145-46 (1973).
116. See Holland v. Boeing Co., 90 Wn. 2d 384, 390-91, 583 P.2d 621, 624 (1978) (stating
that appellate review of factual determinations is limited to whether substantial evidence supports
trial court finding).
117. The Senate Select Committee commented as follows:
The bill does not establish any standards for determining whether the amount paid for the
release was reasonable or not. It is felt that the courts can rule on this issue without specific
guidance from the Legislature. The reasonableness of the release will depend on various factors
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Courts should hesitate to hold either pre- or post-filing settlements unrea-
sonable. Denial of approval would be appropriate if proof of collusion
between settling parties is present 18 or if the settlement amount is grossly
disproportionate to the apparent value of the claim at the time of settle-
ment. Absent these conditions, the courts should place a heavy burden on
the nonsettling tort-feasors challenging a settlement.
Several policy reasons, applicable as well to other provisions, support
restraint. First, the judicially declared policy of tort law in Washington is
to achieve full compensation of injured plaintiffs.' '9 When a pre-filing
settlement is declared unreasonable, the plaintiff's judgment is reduced
by the unreasonable amount and the plaintiff has no source from which to
recover this loss, because the settling tort-feasors have been discharged.
The less often this occurs, the nearer our system will be to the ideal of full
compensation.
Second, willingness to approve settlements will encourage settle-
ments. 120 Liberal approval of post-filing settlements should increase the
number of settlements. 121 Liberal approval of pre-filing settlements will
give the plaintiff an incentive to settle, because the risk of reduction of
total recovery will be lessened. This will help ameliorate the increased
burden on courts resulting from the reasonableness hearings. 22
Third, ready approval of settlements is consistent with retention of
joint and several liability and the provision reducing plaintiff's recovery
by only the amount received in settlement. 23 Both of these rules give
priority to the plaintiff's full recovery over equitable distribution of liabil-
ity among defendants. Because low settlements are unfair only to nonset-
tling tort-feasors, liberal approval of settlements is consistent with this
policy.
including the provable liability of the released parties and the liability limits of the released
party's insurance.
SENATE REPORT. supra note 7. at 54, reprinted in 1981 WASH. S. JOUR. 636.
118. The unreasonable setttlement provision was put in the Tort Reform Act to avoid such
.sweetheart releases." Id. This concern supports the view that the provision should be used in only
limited circumstances.
119. See notes 50 & 106 and accompanying text supra.
120. See notes 92-93 and 101-109 and accompanying text supra.
121. Denying approval to a post-filing settlement would likely forestall that settlement, because
the tort-feasor may prefer to risk litigation rather than increase the settlement offer to an amount the
court would deem reasonable.
122. Hearings on post-filing settlements are automatic, and nonsettling tort-feasors are likely to
demand hearings on pre-filing settlements frequently because determinations that the settlements
were unreasonable will reduce their aggregate liability.





The 1981 Tort Reform Act greatly changes Washington tort law by cre-
ating a right of contribution among tort-feasors. The Act provides elabo-
rate procedural enforcement mechanisms. The Act also raises several pol-
icy issues about the rights of tort-feasors and injured plaintiffs and about
the necessity of efficient disposition of tort claims. The retention of joint
and several liability and the Act's settlement provisions give tort-feasors
broad powers to apportion liability among themselves. Tort-feasors can-
not use these powers to interfere with the rights of the injured plaintiff to a
full recovery.
The procedural provisions of the Tort Reform Act require extensive
court involvement, which raises the spectre of increasingly clogged
courts. In order to minimize the burden, encourage settlements, and in-
sure plaintiffs full recoveries, courts should approve settlements liberally.
Deference to the agreements of settling parties will give the Tort Reform
Act its intended interpretation and will comport with longstanding poli-
cies of Washington tort law.
Scott I. Anderson
